ushouse

Redistricting & House Elections 2012-20: A Structural Analysis

REDMAP, the Republican plan to aggressively gerrymander the states where they controlled the 2011 redistricting process, is well documented.1 As a result, Republicans enjoyed an almost 20-seat advantage toward control of the House relative to Democrats after the new maps were drawn a decade ago. Where the state-by-state vote share suggested Republicans should have only won 216 seats, they won 234. Even though they garnered less than half the total votes, they won more than half the seats and controlled the House—a “wrong winner” anti-majoritarian result.

What is not well understood is that it could have been worse, on the one hand, and that also it got better, on the other. What follows is a structural postmortem of redistricting and congressional elections 2012-20 independent of individual candidates and campaigns.

Data & Methodology

This analysis uses the concept of unearned seats (UE): the seats a party wins in excess of the number of whole seats closest to proportional representation (PR) based on the two-party vote share for a state. By convention, UE seats favoring Republicans are positive, and UE seats favoring Democrats are negative (hereafter simply R’s and D’s). Because UE seats depend on the two-party vote shares, they decouple this analysis from changing vote shares.

The election data supporting this analysis is the official data from the Clerk of the House with results for uncontested races imputed.2

Table 1 (at the end and linked here) shows UE seats for each state over time:

The last column identifies the entity that controlled the initial redistricting in the 2010 cycle

The states are sorted by their average UE seats for 2012-16, from most R favoring (+) to most D favoring (–). This highlights four distinct groups:

Organizing the data this way makes it easier to see the macro dynamics over time.

It Could Have Been Worse

During the decade before REDMAP, 2002-10, R’s enjoyed a small average national net UE seat advantage of 3.2 seats compared to what they should have won based on the two-party vote share (Table 2). With REDMAP redistricting, the R advantage in states where they controlled the redistricting process more than doubled from 18.4 seats to 46.33 seats. As a result, R’s enjoyed a new post-redistricting national advantage that averaged 21.67 seats. This is REDMAP, in a nutshell.

Table 2

Table 2: R/D Seat Advantage 2010-20

That advantage wasn’t bigger, because D UE seat in other states increased -8.47 seats to -24.67 seats at the same time. I wasn’t aware of this, and I did not expect to discover it.

Three factors contributed to this countervailing change:

Without these offsetting changes, the R advantage due to REDMAP would have been roughly 30 seats instead of 20.

It Got Better

The other dynamic that I wasn’t aware of and didn’t expect to find was that the early R advantage due to REDMAP disappeared in 2018 and 2020. You can this see numerically in Table 2 and visually in Figure 1. For 2018 and 2020, net UE seats averaged just -0.50, i.e., was almost proportional nationally.

Figure 1

Figure 1: R/D Seat Advantage 2010-20

The average UE seats for the first R group in Table 1 declined an average of -11.17 seats from the 2012-16 average to an average of 35.5 seats the 2018-20, with the bulk of the change (84%) coming from five states. The first three were states in which R gerrymanders were redrawn mid-decade:

In addition, while the plans didn’t change in MI and VA, how they performed did. Five competitive districts in these two R-drawn maps flipped blue:

To eke out extra R wins, both maps had been drawn with significant R/D asymmetries that “packed” D’s and created some thin-margin semi-competitive districts that R’s would win.6 With significantly greater two-party D vote shares in 2018 and 2020, however, D’s were able to flip them.7

The changes to UE seats in the second R-leaning group, were much smaller, just 0.33 in aggregate.

At the same time, the aggregate UE seats for the D group increased an average of -9.83 seats in 2018 and 2020—the blue-leaning states got bluer. Much of that change (-6.67 seats, 68%) came from competitive districts flipping blue in the face of increased two-party D vote share in two states:

While both plans were drawn by commissions – NJ’s political, CA’s independent – both also included semi-competitive seats with relatively thin R margins.8 In the face of increased D two-party vote shares in 2018 and 2020, these districts elected D’s.

Conclusion

REDMAP could not have happened to begin with if redistricting maps had been drawn by independent commissions. It was partially redressed by courts overturning a few egregious partisan gerrymanders. More importantly though, a dozen competitive districts in five states acted as feedback mechanisms that enabled the system to autocorrect to near national proportionality.

Appendix: Table 1

Table 1

Footnotes

  1. See Ratf**cked: The True Story Behind the Secret Plan to Steal America's Democracy, Dave Daley (2016). 

  2. The official results, revised results, the code for imputing uncontested races, and a description of it are all in this GitHub repository: https://github.com/alecramsay/ushouse

  3. AZ got a 9th representative in the apportionment based on the 2010 census. 

  4. Declination 8.16 => -4.52 degrees; average R win 56.02% => 57.20%; average D win 69.90% => 68.90%. Map http://bit.ly/3W7e9vl => http://bit.ly/3ILtwGI. 

  5. Average two-party D vote share 46.7% => 53.0%. 

  6. MI declination: 22.01 degrees; average R win: 55.84%; average D win: 68.75% (map: http://bit.ly/3vZqmHR). VA declination: 10.33 degrees; average R win: 57.70%; average D win: 64.20% (map: http://bit.ly/3CLW7YV). 

  7. These districts are in the competitive region of the rank-votes graphs, http://bit.ly/3XpYHeP and http://bit.ly/3X5y4vT, respectively. 

  8. NJ (map: http://bit.ly/3XrN86T), CA (map: https://davesredistricting.org/join/09a02b57-93e8-4d59-8a04-bd7d65edf820).